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ABSTRACT
Game trees (or extensive-form games) were first defined by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in 1944. In this paper, we examine the use of game trees for
representing Bayesian decision problems. We propose a method for solving game
trees using local computation. This method is a special case of a method due to
Wilson for computing equilibria in 2-person games. Game trees differ from
decision trees in the representations of information constraints and uncertainty. We
compare the game tree representation and solution technique with other techniques
for decision analysis such as decision trees, influence diagrams, and valuation
networks.
Key Words: Game trees, decision trees, influence diagrams, valuation networks, roll-
back method
1 . INTRODUCTION
Game trees were defined first by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]. In 1953, Kuhn proposed
a more general definition. Game trees were extensively studied in the 1950s and had a strong
influence on the decision tree technique for representing and solving decision problems proposed
by Raiffa and Schlaifer [1961]. Since a decision problem can be viewed as a game in which there
is only one player, the use of game trees for decision theory is natural.
Although there are many features in common between (one-person) game trees and decision
trees, there is a key difference in how information constraints are encoded. In decision trees,
information constraints are encoded by the sequencing of the decision and chance nodes in the
directed tree. Thus if the true value of a chance variable R is known at the time a value of a decision
variable T is chosen, then node R must precede node T in the decision tree. The converse is also
true. If the true value of a chance variable R is not known at the time a value of a decision variable
T is chosen, then node R must follow node T in the decision tree. In game trees, information
constraints are encoded partially by sequencing of chance and decision nodes, and partially by
information sets. Thus, as in decision trees, if the true value of a chance variable R is known at the
time a value of a decision variable T is chosen, then node R must precede node T in the game tree.
The converse is not true. If the true value of a chance variable R is not known at the time a value of
a decision variable T is chosen, then node R does not have to follow node T in the game tree. We
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could have R precede T and use information sets instead to encode the lack of knowledge of R
when a value of T has to be chosen.
The added flexibility of game trees in sequencing decision and chance nodes has two important
consequences. First, in game trees, we can use the sequence of variables to represent time or
causation instead of information. In decision trees, the sequence of nodes must represent
information and nothing else. Thus, for example, if variable D (disease present or not) is the cause
of variable S (symptom exhibited or not), and the decision maker has to make a decision T (to treat
or not) after observing the true value of S (but not D), then in a decision tree, the sequence must be
STD. In a game tree, however, we could, for example, choose sequence DST that represents time
(disease comes first, symptom next, and treatment last).
Second, assuming we have a causal probability model for the chance variables, if we choose to
sequence the chance variables to represent causation, then there is no need for Bayesian revision of
probabilities for representing a problem as a game tree. The need for Bayesian revision of
probabilities in decision tree representation is a major drawback from the viewpoint of artificial
intelligence for two important reasons. First, since typically representation is done by humans, and
solution is done by machine, the representation technique should facilitate representation of a
problem. Ideally, no preprocessing should be required before we can represent a problem in
machine solvable form. Decision trees violate this maxim whereas game trees do not. We note that
influence diagrams were invented by Howard and Matheson [1981] as a “front-end” for decision
trees to avoid the problem of pre-processing the probabilities during the representation phase. (To
solve an influence diagram representation, Howard and Matheson described a method that
consisted of first converting the influence diagram representation to a decision tree representation
and then solving the decision tree representation.) Second, the Bayesian revision of probabilities
required in decision trees can be computationally intractable if the number of chance variables is
large. Elsewhere we have shown that most of the computation involved in Bayesian revision of
probabilities is unnecessary for solving the problem [Shenoy 1994].
We describe a roll-back method (backward recursion, or dynamic programming) to solve game
trees using local computation. This method is a special case of a method due to Wilson [1972] for
computing equilibria of 2-person games (see also [Kreps and Wilson 1982]). The Bayesian
revision of probabilities is part of the solution phase. Also, we can use local computation to some
extent to minimize the computational burden of computing probabilities. The roll-back method for
solving game trees described in this paper generalizes the roll-back method of decision trees.
Influence diagrams and valuation networks are more appropriate representations than decision
trees and game trees for symmetric or almost symmetric decision problems involving many
variables since it is practically intractable to either represent or solve such problems using either
decision or game trees. However if we have a small (i.e., few variables) highly asymmetric
decision problem, then a decision or game tree representation may be more appropriate than
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influence diagrams and valuation networks since the latter are unable to represent asymmetry as
efficiently as decision or game trees. And if we have a small highly asymmetric problem involving
Bayesian revision of probabilities, then the game tree representation and solution technique may be
more appropriate than decision trees since the former involves no pre-processing of probabilities.
An outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the oil wildcatter’s problem
[Raiffa 1967]. This is a small slightly asymmetric problem involving Bayesian revision of
probabilities. We describe the traditional decision tree representation and solution of this problem.
In Section 3, we describe a game tree representation and illustrate it using the oil wildcatter’s
problem. In Section 4, we describe a roll-back method for solving game trees using local
computation. This method generalizes the roll-back method of decision trees. In Section 5, we
compare briefly game trees to decision trees, influence diagrams, and valuation networks. Finally,
in Section 6, we conclude with a summary.
2 . THE OIL WILDCATTER’S PROBLEM
The oil wildcatter’s problem is reproduced with minor modifications from Raiffa [1968].
An oil wildcatter must decide either to drill (d) or not to drill (~d). He is uncertain whether the
hole is dry (dr), wet (we) or soaking (so). Table I shows his monetary payoffs and his subjective
probabilities of the various states. The cost of drilling is $70,000. The net return associated with
the d-we pair is $50,000 that is interpreted as a return of $120,000 less the $70,000 cost of
drilling. Similarly the $200,000 associated with the d-so pair is a net return (a return of $270,000
less the $70,000 cost of drilling). We assume that the wildcatter’s utility function is a linear
function of the monetary profits, i.e., the wildcatter is risk neutral.
Table I.










Dry (dr) –70,000 0 0.500
State Wet (we) 50,000 0 0.300
Soaking (so) 200,000 0 0.200
At a cost of $10,000, the wildcatter could take seismic soundings that will help determine the
geological structure at the site. The soundings will disclose whether the terrain below has no
structure (ns)—that’s bad, or open structure (os)—that’s so-so, or closed structure (cs)—that’s
really hopeful. The experts have provided us with Table II that shows the probabilities of seismic
test results conditional on the amount of oil.
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Table II.
Probabilities of Seismic Test Results Conditional on the Amount of Oil











Amount Dry (dr) 0.600 0.300 0.100
of Wet (we) 0.300 0.400 0.300
Oil (O) Soaking (so) 0.100 0.400 0.500
Figures 1 and 2 show a decision tree representation and solution of this problem. Notice that
even before we can completely specify the decision tree, we have to compute the conditional
probabilities required by the decision tree (since they are not given in the statement of the problem).
This is done in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the probability tree on the left computes the joint
probabilities, and the probability tree on the right computes the marginals of test results and the
conditional probabilities of amount of oil given test results. The conditional probabilities for O
shown in the tree on the right are approximate (rounded-off to three decimal places).
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Figure 2 shows the solution of the oil wildcatter’s problem using the roll-back method. In the
rollback method, we recursively prune chance and decision nodes whose outward neighbors (away
from the root) are all utilities. A chance node is pruned by averaging the utilities using the
probability distribution on its edges. A decision node is pruned by maximizing the utilities
associated with its edges. The optimal strategy is to do a seismic test; not drill if seismic test reveals
no structure, and drill if the seismic test reveals either open or closed structure. The expected profit
associated with this strategy is $22,500.
A count of algebraic binary operations (additions, multiplications, divisions, or comparisons)
required to represent and solve the oil wildcatter’s problem reveals that 24 operations are required
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for preprocessing the probabilities and 30 operations are required to prune the decision tree for a
total of 54 operations. This total count is an imperfect measure of the computational effort required
to solve the decision tree representation as it does not account for other computer operations that
are required to solve the problem.
3 . GAME TREE REPRESENTATION
In this section, we describe a game tree representation of a decision problem. We use Kuhn’s
[1953] definition of an extensive form game appropriately modified. In particular, we assume only
one player (the decision maker), and we assume perfect recall.
A game tree representation of a decision problem consists of the following:
(i). A rooted tree consisting of nodes and edges.
(ii). The leaf nodes of the rooted tree are called utility nodes. To each utility node, there is
assigned a utility value describing the outcome (in von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities [von
Neumann and Morgenstern 1947]) to the decision maker when the problem ends there.
(iii). A partition of the set of non-utility nodes of T into 2 subsets denoted by Γ and ∆. The
elements of Γ are called chance nodes and correspond to chance variables. Each edge leading
out of a chance node corresponds to a possible value of the random variable. The elements of
∆ are called decision nodes and correspond to decision variables. Each edge leading out of a
decision node corresponds to a possible value of the decision variable, i.e., an act available
to the decision maker if that point in the tree is reached.
(iv). Each chance node has a probability distribution over its edges (values).
(v). ∆ is partitioned into k information sets, I1, ..., Ik, such that for each j = 1, ..., k, the
following three conditions are satisfied:
(a) all decision nodes in Ij have the same number of values, and there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the sets of values of nodes in Ij;
(b) every path from the root to a leaf node intersects each Ij at most once (a path may not
intersect an information set at all), and
(c) if a path from the root to a node in Ii intersects another information set, say Ij, then every
path from the root to a node in Ii must intersect the information set Ij and contain the
corresponding edge (value) of the decision node in Ij.
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8 Game Trees for Decision Analysis
The semantics of (i)–(iv) are similar to decision trees and need no further explanation. The
semantics of information sets described in (v) are as follows. When it is the decision-maker’s turn
to choose an act, she is aware of the information set she is in, but does not know the precise vertex
within this set. All nodes in an information set correspond to the same decision variable.
Consequently, condition (a) requires all decision nodes in an information set to have the same
number of edges, and each edge corresponds to a value of the decision variable. Condition (b)
states that a node in an information set cannot come after another one in the same information set.
Condition (c) states that at each information set, the decision-maker remembers past decisions (her
choices at earlier decision nodes). Condition (c) is called “perfect recall” in game theory [Kuhn
1953, Hart 1992].
Figure 3 shows a game tree representation of the oil wildcatter’s problem. Notice that in the
game tree, random variable O (amount of oil) comes before R (test results). Also the decision
nodes are partitioned into 5 information sets, I1, ..., I5. I1, for example, encodes the fact that the
oil wildcatter does not know the amount of oil at the time he decides whether to conduct a seismic
test (t) or not (~t). I2 encodes the fact that the oil wildcatter knows the decision made at node T (no
seismic test), but not the amount of oil. At I3, I4, and I5, the oil wildcatter knows the decision at
node T (conduct a seismic test), and the test result, but not the amount of oil. Notice that no
preprocessing is required to represent the problem as a game tree. Finally, the nodes in the
information set I1 precede nodes in information sets I2, ..., I4. This reflects the fact that the
decision whether to conduct a seismic test or not precedes the decision whether to drill or not.
Information sets give us flexibility to represent a problem as a game tree with chance variables
in any sequence. The only constraint we have in sequencing chance and decision nodes is that if a
random variable R is observed when a decision D has to be made, then the chance node R must
precede decision node D in the game tree. In decision trees, we do not have information sets.
Instead, the sequence of chance variables represents information constraints and thus we have less
flexibility than in game trees. It is this flexibility that allows us to represent any decision problem
with no preprocessing.
4 . A ROLL-BACK METHOD FOR SOLVING GAME TREES
In this section, we describe a roll-back method for solving a decision problem using local
computation starting from its game tree representation. This roll-back method is a special case of a
more general method due to Wilson [1972] for computing equilibria of 2-person games.
In game theory, an optimal strategy of a game tree is found by first reducing the game tree to an
equivalent strategic form by (1) enumerating all strategies available to the decision maker, (2)
enumerating all possible events (configuration of values of all random variables), (3) computing
the utility for each strategy-event pair, and (4) computing the joint distribution of all random
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variables. Once we have a strategic form, computing an optimal strategy is easy. We simply
compute the expected utility of each strategy, and choose an optimal strategy that has the highest
expected utility.
A strategic form for the oil wildcatter’s problem is shown in Table III. Each row corresponds
to a distinct strategy. A strategy is a 5-tuple that specifies an action in each of the 5 information sets
I1, ..., I5. Each column corresponds to a configuration of the joint frame of all chance variables.
There are two computational problems associated with the strategic form technique. First, the
number of strategies is an exponential function of the number of information sets. Second, the
number of events is an exponential function of the number of random variables. Thus computing
the strategic form of a game tree is computationally intractable when we have many information
sets or if we have many random variables. We will now describe a method for solving a game tree
representation of a decision problem using local computation (or dynamic programming).
If each information set is a singleton, then we solve the game tree using the backward recursion
method of dynamic programming [Zermelo 1913, Kuhn 1953]. This technique is also called “roll-
back method” in decision tree literature. A decision tree can be thought of as a game tree in which
each information set is a singleton subset.
The backward recursion method of dynamic programming can be generalized to include non-
singleton information sets. We start from the neighbors of utility nodes and go toward the root
until all decision nodes have been pruned. The rule for pruning chance nodes is exactly the same as
in the roll-back method of decision trees. The rule for pruning decision nodes is slightly different
from the roll-back method of decision trees.
Table III
A Strategic Form Representation of the Oil Wildcatter’s Problem
Profit, $000 (dr, ns) (dr, os) (dr, cs) (we, ns) (we, os) (we, cs) (so, ns) (so, os) (so, cs) EMV
(t, –, d, d, d) –80 –80 –80 40 40 40 190 190 190 10
(t, –, d, d, ~d) –80 –80 –10 40 40 –10 190 190 –10 –11
(t, –, d, ~d, d) –80 –10 –80 40 –10 40 190 –10 190 –1.50
(t, –, d, ~d, ~d) –80 –10 –10 40 –10 –10 190 –10 –10 –22.50
(t, –, ~d, d, d) –10 –80 –80 –10 40 40 –10 190 190 22.50
(t, –, ~d, d, ~d) –10 –80 –10 –10 40 –10 –10 190 –10 1.50
(t, –, ~d, ~d, d) –10 –10 –80 –10 –10 40 –10 –10 190 11
(t, –, ~d, ~d, ~d) –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10 –10
(~t, d, –, –, –) –70 –70 –70 50 50 50 200 200 200 20
(~t, ~d, –, –, –) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Probability .300 .150 .050 .090 .120 .090 .020 .080 .100
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Pruning Chance Nodes. Suppose that we have a chance node all of whose edges lead to
utility nodes. We prune a chance node in two steps. First we compute the average of the utilities at
the ends of its edges using the probability distribution on its edges. Second we replace the sub-tree
consisting of the chance node, its edges, and the corresponding utility nodes, by a utility node
whose utility value is the average computed in the first step.
Pruning Decision Nodes. The rule for pruning decision nodes in singleton information
sets is exactly the same as in decision tree. Let us review this rule. Suppose we have a decision
node in a singleton information set all of whose edges lead to utility nodes. First, we compute the
maximum of the utilities at the ends of all edges leading out of the decision node. Second, we
identify an edge that leads to the maximum computed in the first step. If we have alternative
optimal edges, then any one of the optimal edges can be identified. Third, we replace the sub-tree
consisting of the decision node, its edges, and the corresponding utility nodes by a utility node
whose value equals the maximum utility identified in the first step. Notice that the second step in
the pruning rule is necessary to identify an optimal strategy at the end of the roll-back method.
Before we explain how to prune a decision node in a non-singleton information set, we make
the following observations. Although we can prune each decision node individually, it will be
efficient to prune all decision nodes in an information set before we prune other nodes. Since all
decision nodes in an information set correspond to the same decision variable, we need to identify
one value of the decision variable as an optimal act that the decision maker must choose if she finds
herself in that information set.
Suppose we have an information set such that the edges leading out of the decision nodes end
at utility nodes. First, we compute the conditional probability distribution on the decision nodes of
the information set conditioned on the event that we have reached the information set (the details of
this step are explained in the following paragraph). Second, for each value of the decision variable
associated with the information set, we compute the expected utility using the utilities at the end of
corresponding edges and using the conditional distribution computed in the first step. Third, we
identify a value of the decision variable (and the corresponding edges of each decision node)
associated with the maximum expected utility. Fourth, we prune each decision node by replacing
the corresponding subtree by a utility node whose utility is equal to the utility at the end of its edge
identified in step 3. We call this rule (for pruning decision nodes in an information set) pruning by
maximization of conditional expectation. Pruning by maximization of conditional expectation
generalizes the rule for pruning a singleton information set by maximization.
Computing the conditional distribution for an information set is easy. For each decision node in
the information set, we simply multiply all probabilities on the edges in the path from the root to
the decision node. If the path involves acts, then we assume the probabilities of such edges to be 1.
This gives an unconditional distribution on the nodes in the information set. The sum of these
probabilities gives us the probability of reaching the information set assuming prior decisions that
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allow us to get there. To compute the conditional distribution, we normalize this unconditional
distribution by dividing by the sum of the probabilities. As we will see shortly, from a
computational perspective, the normalization step is unnecessary and can be dispensed with. It is
only required for semantical reasons.
We will illustrate pruning decision nodes by conditional expectation for the game tree
representation of the oil wildcatter’s problem. Consider information set I5. Notice that all three
decision nodes in I5 have edges leading to utility nodes. The unconditional distribution for the three
nodes in I5 (from top to bottom) is given by the probability vector (0.5*0.1, 0.3*0.3, 0.2*0.5) =
(0.05, 0.09, 0.10). The sum of these probabilities is 0.24. The conditional distribution is given by
( 0.050.24  ,  
0.09
0.24  ,  
0.10
0.24  ) ≅  (0.208, 0.375, 0.417). Thus for D = d, the expected utility is (0.208 *–
80) + (0.375*40) + (0.417*190) = 77.5, and for D = ~d, the expected utility is (0.208 *–10) +
(0.375*–10) + (0.417*–10) = –10. Since 77.5 > –10, we identify edge D = d with each node in
I5. The resulting pruned game tree is shown in Figure 4.
Notice that for the purposes of pruning decision nodes in an information set, there is no need to
normalize the unconditional distribution. We can compute the “expected utility” using the
unconditional probability distribution since the same normalization constant (that is always
positive) can be factored out of all expected values being compared. Thus, solving game trees
involves no divisions.
A comment on computing the unconditional probability distribution of an information set. If we
have a game tree with many variables, then computing the conditional distribution as described
above can be computationally intensive. However, note that we can simplify the computation as
follows. If the paths from the root to the decision nodes in an information set share a common sub-
path, then the probabilities on the common sub-path can be ignored in computing the conditional
distribution. This is because these probabilities get canceled in the normalization process.
Furthermore, if the paths from the root to the decision nodes include edges having the same
probability, then again, we can ignore these probabilities for the same reason as above. Thus to a
limited extent, we can exploit conditional independencies in the joint probability distribution.
Figure 5 shows the result after we prune the entire game tree. The optimal strategy for the oil
wildcatter is to conduct a seismic test; if the test result is no structure, then do not drill; and if the
test result is either open structure or closed structure, then drill. The expected profit associated with
the optimal strategy is $22,500.
A count of algebraic binary operations required to solve the game tree representation of the oil
wildcatter’s problems using the roll-back method reveals that 9 operations are required to compute
the unconditional distributions at the 5 information sets, 11 operations are required to prune each of
the five information sets, and 5 operations are required to prune each of the four chance nodes, for
a total of 84 operations.
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14 Game Trees for Decision Analysis
Comparing with the corresponding decision tree representation, the roll-back method involves
30 more operations. Some of the savings in decision tree representation comes from not having
chance variable O after the decision to not drill (since it is not relevant). In other words, 20
additional operations in game tree solution comes from a failure to recognize that in 4 of the 5
information sets, the decision to not drill results in a constant utility (independent of the value of
amount of oil), but the game tree representation is unable to represent this fact explicitly, and
therefore fails to take advantage of it. Furthermore, the roll-back method does not take advantage
of the conditional expected utility computed at each information set. The conditional expected utility
is used only to prune decision nodes in each information set, and then it is discarded. In [Shenoy
1995], we describe an alternative method for solving game trees that is sometimes more efficient
than the roll-back method just described.
The correctness of the roll-back method described here is easy to show using dynamic
programming techniques (by correctness, we mean that the rollback method will always identify an
optimal strategy as defined by the strategic form of the decision problem). A sketch of a proof is as
follows. The roll-back method described here uses the backward recursion technique of dynamic
programming to compute an optimal behavioral strategy. Since the decision maker has perfect
recall, it follows from Kuhn [1953] that behavioral strategies suffice, i.e., an optimal behavioral
strategy is also an optimal strategy. Therefore the optimal behavioral strategy identified by the roll-
back method is an optimal strategy.
5 . COMPARISON
In this section, we compare briefly game tree representation and solution method with other
representation and solution methods, namely decision trees, influence diagrams, and valuation
networks.
Comparison with Decision Trees. There are many similarities between decision trees and
game trees. Game trees generalize decision trees. A decision tree can be considered a game tree in
which all information sets are singletons. Given any game tree representation of a decision
problem, we can always find a decision tree representation of the same problem (where all
information sets are singletons) and we call such a decision tree representation a corresponding
decision tree.
What makes game trees different from decision trees are information sets. Information sets give
game trees added flexibility over decision trees. The sequence of variables in a game tree can
represent time, causation, etc. In a decision tree, the sequence of variables must represent
information. One advantage of this added flexibility is that we can structure a decision problem so
that no preprocessing of probabilities is required before representing a problem as a game tree. The
preprocessing of probabilities is a major drawback of decision trees.
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The roll-back method in game trees is conceptually more complex than the roll-back method in
decision trees since the maximization rule for pruning decision nodes in the latter is replaced by
maximization of conditional expectation rule for pruning decision nodes in non-singleton
information sets in the former.
We do not have any general results on the computational efficiency of the game tree roll-back
method compared to decision tree roll-back method. As we saw for the oil wildcatter’s problem,
the game tree roll-back method is less efficient than the decision tree roll-back method. However,
in the decision problem shown in Figure 6, solving the game tree representation shown using roll-
back method requires only 7 algebraic binary operations whereas solving the corresponding
decision tree representation shown requires 13 operations.
For the oil wildcatter’s problem, the game tree representation shown in Figure 3 is bushier than
the decision tree representation shown in Figure 2. The decision tree representation has only 16
leaves whereas the game tree has 24 leaves. Is this true in general? The answer is no. It is easy to
construct asymmetric decision problems such that a game tree representation has fewer leaves than
a corresponding decision tree. Figure 6 shows an example where this is true. In symmetric
decision problems, both game trees and decision trees will have the same number of leaves (equal
to the product of the sizes of the frames of all variables in the problem).
In general, in game trees, there will always be as many information sets as decision nodes in a
corresponding decision tree. Since information sets may contain more than one decision node,
game trees will have at least as many decision nodes as in corresponding decision trees. Thus in
the oil wildcatter’s problem, the game tree representation shown in Figure 3 has 15 decision nodes,




















































16 Game Trees for Decision Analysis
whereas the decision tree representation shown in Figure 2 has only 5 decision nodes. Typically,
in decision trees, decision nodes occur closer to the root whereas in game trees, decision nodes are
closer to the leaves. Thus, typically, there are more decision nodes in game trees than in
corresponding decision trees.
Typically, in game trees, chance nodes occur closer to the root than in corresponding decision
trees. Thus, game trees typically have less chance nodes than corresponding decision trees. For the
oil wildcatter’s problem, the game tree representation shown in Figure 3 has one occurrence of O
and three occurrences of R, whereas the decision tree representation shown in Figure 2 has one
occurrence of R and 4 occurrences of O. In asymmetric problems, game trees may have more
chance nodes than in corresponding decision trees.
A major disadvantage of decision tree representation is its combinatorial explosion when there
are many variables. Game trees also suffer from this disadvantage. Thus, like decision trees, game
trees are practical only for small problems (i.e., with few variables).
Comparison with Influence Diagrams and Valuation Networks. The influence
diagram representation was proposed by Howard and Matheson [1981]. A technique for solving
influence diagram directly (without first converting them to decision trees as was described by
Howard and Matheson) was proposed by Olmsted [1983] and Shachter [1986]. The valuation
network representation and solution method was proposed by Shenoy [1992, 1993a, 1993b]. Both
influence diagrams and valuation networks are useful representations for symmetric (or almost
symmetric) problems. Figure 7 shows an influence diagram representation of the oil wildcatter’s
problem. The quantitative information is omitted. Figure 8 shows a valuation network
representation of the oil wildcatter’s problem. Again, the details of the probability functions, ο and
ρ, and the details of the profit functions, π and κ, are omitted.
For small highly asymmetric problems, these techniques are inefficient when compared to
decision trees and game trees. Call and Miller [1990], Fung and Shachter [1990], Smith, Holtzman
and Matheson [1993], Kirkwood [1993], and Covaliu and Oliver [1995] examine hybrid
representation methods that combine influence diagrams and decision trees. Shenoy [1993b]
describes an efficient generalization of the valuation network technique for asymmetric decision
problems.
The solution techniques of influence diagrams and valuation networks use local computation
not only for identifying an optimal strategy (as in game trees), but also for computing probabilities
(unlike game trees). These techniques exploit conditional independencies in the joint probability
distribution [Shenoy 1994]. Since conditional independence is not explicitly represented in game




Game trees are similar in many respects to the decision trees. Game trees were proposed first by
von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] and later generalized by Kuhn [1953] in the context of
games. Game trees pre-date decision trees. Decision trees were invented by Raiffa and Schlaifer in
the late 1950s. In this paper, we have simply restated Kuhn’s definition of game trees for the
special case of one-person games with perfect recall, i.e., for decision problems. Game trees are













































18 Game Trees for Decision Analysis
more general than decision trees. A decision tree can be thought of as a special case of a game tree
in which all information sets are singletons.
The main contribution of this paper is to re-introduce the concept of information sets from
game theory to representation information constraints in one-person decision problems. A distinct
advantage of using information sets is not having to pre-process the probabilities that is required in
a decision tree representation of some decision problems. Based on this idea, Charnes and Shenoy
[1996] propose a Monte Carlo method for solving decision problems that uses the conditionals
stated in an influence diagram representation directly as opposed to explicitly converting them
using arc reversals before doing the Monte Carlo sampling.
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